The dramatic FTX crash
Nobody expected that the sudden collapse of FTX would result in another “119” anniversary for the crypto industry, in addition to “312” and “519.”
This FTX incident is also known as the Lehman crisis in the crypto world.
First, a financial document about SBF’s Alameda Research’s debt situation was disclosed by CoinDesk on November 3. The key point was that it held a total of $14.6 billion in assets as of June 30, nearly half of which were related to FTT and Solana.
Then, on the evening of November 6, CZ announced that Binance would sell all FTT on its books in the coming months, speeding up the collapse process.
Although Alameda’s balance sheet was concerning at first, a back-and-forth statement between Alameda, SBF, and CZ helped to calm market concerns. Everyone was just spilling the tea, not realizing that a storm was coming.
Until the early morning of November 9, when SBF tweeted that “a strategic deal agreement for FTX.com has been reached with Binance, and the team is working hard to deal with the backlog of withdrawals.”
CZ retweeted and confirmed, saying that a non-binding letter of intent was signed, and the market returned after a brief optimistic upswing. However, the deal was broken and the crisis began.
The impact of the “119” incident on the entire market is not only measured in terms of assets and prices, but also in terms of industry confidence and regulatory expectations. One of the world’s top three trading platforms, a leading company in the spotlight, privately embezzled user assets and caused billions of dollars in losses.
Few could have predicted that the start of all of this, and that the secondary disaster it caused may have only just begun.
The “FTX moment” of CEX
Looking at the crypto industry and the entire history of CEX, you will notice that all kinds of accidents (hackers, self-theft, etc.) of CEX are nearly impossible to cut off. Follow are other historical crises that had happened before.
Mt.Gox was once known as the “world’s largest bitcoin trading platform.”
Mt.Gox is the industry’s most famous CEX, with a trading market share of more than 80% of the world, so it’s easy to imagine that when the hacker stole the coins, it had an unprecedented impact on the entire Bitcoin trading market.
However, despite the official announcement that it lost 750,000 bitcoins to customers and 100,000 bitcoins from his own company, the entire process appeared quite confusing and paradoxical.
According to media reports, in the “stolen” bitcoins, hackers actually stole only 7,000, and the rest were actually taken by “insiders,” and this insider is likely to be the CEO himself.
The “stolen” portion of Bitcoin was worth $487 million at the time of the accident. This bitcoin is worth more than $30 billion at today’s prices.
Bitfinex: The first person to issue bonds to help himself, the first person on the “debt-to-equity” trading platform
In August 2016, Bitfinex was stolen for about 120,000 bitcoins, valued at $70 million at the time. When the market became suspicious, Bitfinex devised a method to force users to get through the difficult situation:
It forcibly removed 36% of digital assets from almost all users’ accounts and issued BFXCoin Tokens with an initial value of $1 to each user, which can be traded or purchased shares of Bitfinex’s parent company, iFinex.
Zhao Dong, the founder of DFund, who was once extremely active on Weibo and frequently spoke out for Bitfinex and can be referred to as the “spokesperson of Bitfinex China,” chose to “debt-to-equity” and became a shareholder of Bitfinex at this time.
The founder of QuadrigaCX died mysteriously.
QuadrigaCX, a Canada’s largest cryptocurrency trading platform, was the strangest trading platform ever.
It’s founder, Gerald Cotten, died unexpectedly, and paradoxically, QuadrigaCX’s cold wallet private key was controlled solely by him, preventing approximately $145 million in crypto assets from being withdrawn, and eventually prompting investors and other relevant stakeholders to request an autopsy. Netflix even made a documentary “Trust No One: The Hunt for the Crypto King”.
Trust No One: The Hunt for the Crypto King | Official Trailer | Netflix – YouTube
Do Kwon and the Terra crash
Looking back on the entire UST de-anchoring crisis in May and the death stampede of the entire Terra ecology, the algorithmic stablecoin self-balancing mechanism minted by LUNA-UST in both directions can be described as the culprit.
To begin with, on May 8, 2022, some giant whales began to sell UST one after the other, resulting in a slight breakdown in UST and a tilt in the liquidity of the UST-3Crv pool.
On May 9, a large amount of money began to flee Anchor, putting significant strain on UST Anchor. In response, the Luna Foundation Guard (LFG) proposed rescue measures that include lending $750 million in bitcoin to protect the UST.
Although the purchase of UST minted LUNA for arbitrage has begun to grow, compared to the vast majority of users who still trust the Terra ecosystem, such arbitrage scale has had little impact on Terra’s exchange rate.
Do Kwon remained hidden and did not propose effective measures in time to stabilize market expectations. He allowed the UST exchange rate to be at a discount for a long time, and market confidence eventually collapsed under the wear of time and the increasing arbitrage temptation. The original LUNA and UST completely collapsed in the following days.
Since then, the history of Do Kwon have been revealed, including Rick Sanchez, an anonymous member of the algorithmic stablecoin project Basis Cash. In September, Interpol issued a red notice to Terra founder Do Kwon, completing the identity transformation from an industry figure to a crypto wanted criminal.
Three Arrows Capital was hit by a sudden thunderstorm
Three Arrows Capital, founded in 2012 as a crypto hedge fund by Su Zhu and Kyle Davies, exploded in a series of crises triggered by the Terra crash.
It once drew the attention of the entire industry, especially with the big bets on GBTC, Avalanche, Terra, and Su Zhu’s high-profile controversy about Ethereum and the new public chain on social platforms.
However, following the demise of the Terra empire in May, cryptocurrency broker Voyager Digital announced in late June that it had issued a default notice to 3AC via its operating subsidiary, Voyager Digital LLC, for failing to repay 15,250 bitcoins and 350 million USDC loans on time.
The incident completely blew the lid off the 3AC incident, and 3AC representatives filed for bankruptcy protection in New York courts in early July under Chapter 15 of the United States Bankruptcy Code.
Summary
There is nothing new under the sun; the once brilliant trader and DeFi giant whale became an industry villain overnight, and the once vast and invincible public chain ecology and stable empire collapsed in less than a week.
Although these crises have triggered a degree of industry liquidity traps, and may even invite stricter and more passive regulatory responses, the risks exposed are not bad, and will gradually increase the system’s robustness.
In the crypto world, there is no myth, breaking the obsession with giant whales, disenchantment institutions, and possibly hidden dark threads during the period.
As a result, whether an old player or a new user, gradually understanding DEX and shifting usage habits and asset allocation towards DEX is a topic that must be addressed.